DEAN FOODS CO Form DEFA14A May 08, 2012

UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

SCHEDULE 14A

Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a)

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

(Amendment No.)		
Filed by the Registrant x		
Filed by a Party other than the Registrant "		
Check the appropriate box:		
 Preliminary Proxy Statement Definitive Proxy Statement X Definitive Additional Materials Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12 	Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2)) Dean Foods Company	
(Nan	ne of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)	

 $(Name\ of\ Person(s)\ Filing\ Proxy\ Statement,\ if\ other\ than\ the\ Registrant)$

Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):

- x No fee required.
- " Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11.
 - 1) Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:

2)	Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:
3)	Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):
4)	Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:
5)	Total fee paid:
Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.	
Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.	
1)	Amount Previously Paid:
2)	Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
3)	Filing Party:
4)	Date Filed:

Dean Foods Company Annual Meeting Voting Considerations May 2012

Compensation-Related Matters
Dean Foods Company is soliciting your advisory vote on executive compensation
ISS recommends voting FOR
our executive compensation program
our pay for performance is rated as a low concern

ISS notes that we responded to stockholder concerns by eliminating excise tax gross-ups in future change-in-control agreements

Glass Lewis recommends voting AGAINST (i) our executive compensation program because, among other reasons, they allege we have failed to align pay for performance and (ii) election of J. Wayne Mailloux to the Board because he serves on our Compensation Committee We strongly disagree with Glass Lewis analysis, which seems to utilize a substantially different peer group that may not include CPG companies in its pay for performance analysis and continues to penalize our compensation structure for having excise tax gross-ups despite our adoption of the policy prospectively eliminating gross-ups in change-in-control agreements

Compensation-Related Matters

Our Board recommends you vote FOR

our executive compensation program

Our compensation policies and practices link pay to performance and strongly align the interests of our executive officers with our stockholders

We eliminated excise tax gross-ups for future change-in-control agreements in response to stockholder concerns and corporate governance best practices

We recently adopted stock ownership guidelines

Our CEO reduced his base salary with approval of the Compensation Committee in

```
view of 2010 performance
 We
finished
2011
with
a
return
to
growth
in
the
third
and
fourth
quarters
of
2011
and
met or exceeded our guidance to investors in each quarter of 2011
 Our Board recommends you vote FOR
the election of Mr. Mailloux to the Board
 Mr.
Mailloux
should
not
be
punished
merely
for
being
part
of
our
Compensation
Committee. If stockholders disapprove of the company s executive compensation they
have
the
ability
express
such
disapproval
in
the
 Say-on-Pay
vote
 Mr. Mailloux s experience in the beverage industry, combined with his global business
experience, make him well qualified to advise our company
2
```

Separation of Chairman and CEO Role

A

stockholder

proposal

seeks

to

urge

the

Board

to adopt policy that the Board s Chairman be an independent director ISS and Glass Lewis each recommends voting FOR this proposal We strongly disagree with ISS and Glass Lewis recommendations, and the Board recommends voting AGAINST this proposal Nine out of ten members of our Board are independent Our Board has an independent lead director whose duties are closely aligned with the role of an independent chairman, including (i) calling all Board meetings, (ii) approving the schedule and agenda for all Board meetings, (iii) presiding at executive sessions of the Board and (iv) acting as a liaison between the independent directors and our CEO The independent members of the **Board** meet regularly in executive session The majority of S&P 500 companies

have

combined
the
Chairman
and
CEO
roles
Combining the Chairman and CEO roles facilitates information flow between
management and the Board

Accelerated Vesting of Equity Awards

A

stockholder

proposal

seeks

to

urge

the

Board

```
to
adopt
policy
prohibiting
the
acceleration of equity awards upon a change in control of the company
 ISS and Glass Lewis recommends voting FOR
this proposal claiming that a
change
in
control
would
provide
 economic
windfall
to
plan
participants
and
CEO
 We strongly disagree with ISS
and Glass Lewis
recommendations and the
Board recommends voting AGAINST
this proposal
 Flexible compensation policies are imperative to recruit and retain executive talent
 Accelerated vesting of equity awards upon a change in control (i) aligns executive and
stockholder interests, (ii) enables the company to retain its management team while a
change in control transaction is pending, and (iii) avoids potential conflicts of interest and
distractions that may arise when the company is going through a change in control
 A
majority
of
our
peers
do
not
have
such
policy
SO
adoption
of
the
proposed
policy
would disadvantage us in recruiting and retaining executive talent
```

Such a policy would penalize management if we were taken private

Equity Retention Guidelines
A stockholder
proposal
seeks
to
urge

the

Board

to

adopt a policy requiring senior executives retain until retirement at least 75% of shares received through compensation programs. Glass Lewis recommends voting AGAINST this proposal because the proposed policy may hinder the ability of the compensation committee to attract and retain executive talent and it does not believe that the proposal serves the best interests of shareholders at this time. We agree with this assessment of the proposal. ISS recommends voting FOR this proposal [b]ased on the spirit of the proposal We strongly disagree with ISS recommendation because it fails to (i) provide a detailed analysis of the proposal, (ii) properly account for the stock ownership guidelines already adopted by the Board, (iii) consider that such a policy is unusual for our peer group, and (iv) recognize the significant disadvantage that such a proposal would have on our ability to attract and retain executive talent

5

Equity Retention Guidelines

Our Board recommends voting AGAINST

this proposal

We have adopted equity ownership guidelines of 5x annual salary for our

CEO and 2x annual salary for our other Executive Officers

Our CEO owns stock worth over 30 times his base salary

The proposed policy would place restrictions on executives until retirement

even if such executive is no longer employed by us

Retention guidelines as proposed are uncommon in our peer group and would significantly inhibit our ability to attract and retain executive talent Our current compensation methodology already provides for meaningful stock ownership by our executives and aligns stockholder and executive interests

6